



Plenary sitting

17.09.2024

JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia since 1 March 2022 and in particular the one of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU's continuous support for Ukraine,
 - having regard to the United Nations Charter, The Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols, and the Rome Statute of the ICC,
 - having regard to the third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the European Commission, and the United Nations published on 14 February 2024,
 - having regard to regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility,
 - having regard to the European Council Conclusions and the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine of 12 July 2023,
 - having regard to the Joint security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine, published on 27 June 2024,
 - having regard to the statement by the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of 10 September 2024 on Iran – Transfers of ballistic missiles to Russia,
 - having regard to NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept,
 - having regard to Rule 132 of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas Russia has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, in continuation of previous aggressions since 2014 including with the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and continues to persistently violate the principles of the UN Charter through its aggressions against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine and to blatantly and grossly violate international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949;
- B. whereas the UNGA, in its resolution of 2 March 2022, immediately qualified the Russian war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution of 14 November 2022, recognized the need to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its war of aggression and legally and financially responsible for its internationally wrongful acts, including by making reparation for the injury and damage caused;
- C. whereas ICC has issued several warrants of arrests to Russian officials responsible for the war crime of directing attacks at civilian objects and of unlawful deportation of population and that of unlawful transfer of population from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, in prejudice of Ukrainian children; whereas in September 2024 Mongolia failed to enforce the ICC arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin;
- D. whereas Ukraine and its citizens have shown unwavering determination in successfully defending their country, despite the high cost in civilian and military casualties ; whereas

Russia's forces continue systematic and indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, forced deportations and disappearances, including of children, along with illegal imprisonments and torture of Ukrainian citizens, executions of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, as well as acts of terror throughout the country, including the use of sexual violence and mass rape as a weapon of war; whereas millions of Ukrainians continue to be displaced inside and outside of Ukraine, having fled Russia's aggression;

- E. whereas since 24th August Russia has launched its most intense aerial bombardment campaign against Ukraine involving large numbers of ballistic missiles, glide bombs, and drones among others in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Odesa, and Lviv, where a recent drone and missile attack killed seven civilians just 70 km from the Polish border; whereas Russia has effectively damaged or destroyed up to 80% of the country's energy infrastructure, which risks creating a severe humanitarian crisis in Ukraine during the coming winter months; whereas such systematic attacks constitute war crimes according to international law;
- F. whereas Ukrainian President Zelenskyy announced that a Russian missile had hit a bulk carrier carrying wheat in the Black Sea and bound for Egypt on 12 September 2024 making food security a renewed target; whereas Russian drones and missiles targeting Ukraine increasingly violate EU and NATO airspace, putting citizens in our Eastern regions at risk;
- G. whereas the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, especially near the frontlines, has become increasingly critical; whereas, according to the UN, recent Russian attacks on critical civilian infrastructure have left tens of thousands of Ukrainians without essential services and more than 14.6 million people, around 40 % of the Ukrainian population, will need humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the intensified hostilities in Kharkivska Oblast in May caused the largest displacement in Ukraine since 2023; whereas due to funding shortfall the UN reports humanitarian aid workers currently cannot fully meet critical needs in the country; whereas the prolongation of the conflict will result in persisting and worsening urgent needs in the coming months; whereas the destruction of infrastructure in Ukraine is having disastrous consequences for the health of women, who are often the ones doing the nursing, medical and care work;
- H. whereas Hungary issued a decree in breach of the temporary protection directive that cancels state funded shelter for refugees from western Ukraine, leaving many, the majority women and children, homeless;
- I. whereas the latest estimation in the joint Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment released by the Government of Ukraine, the World Bank Group, the European Commission and the United Nations is that as of 31 December 2023 the total cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine will amount to at least \$486 billion over the next decade, up from \$411 billion estimated one year ago;
- J. whereas the EU and its Member States have thus far contributed more than EUR 100 billion in financial, humanitarian, refugee and military assistance to Ukraine; whereas the EU has provided over EUR 25 billion of macro-financial support to Ukraine in 2022 and 2023 and has established the Ukraine Facility, a dedicated financial instrument that will allow it to provide Ukraine with up to EUR 50 billion in predictable and flexible financial support during the years 2024 to 2027; whereas the EU made its first regular payment of approximately EUR 4.2 billion under the newly established Ukraine facility in July 2024;

whereas this payment follows the previous bridge and pre-financing support, which totals to EUR 12.2 billion since the establishment of the Facility in March 2024;

- K. whereas Russia has substantially increased its own military spending and production in 2024; whereas Russia is also using Belarus' ammunition stockpile and relying on the military support of several countries, primarily Iran and North Korea; whereas there are reports indicating that China is providing Russia with substantial assistance to bolster its military capabilities, extending beyond dual-use technologies; whereas according to governmental sources Iran has recently transferred shipments of Fath 360 close-range ballistic missiles to Russia; whereas France, Germany and the United Kingdom have announced a new set of sanctions against Iran;
- L. whereas the EU and its Member States, together with international partners and NATO allies, continue providing military support to Ukraine in order to assist it in exercising its legitimate right to self-defence against the Russian war of aggression according to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; whereas the EU Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), has trained about 60 000 members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to date in both combined arms training and specialised training; whereas NATO will ensure an annual financial contribution to Ukraine of EUR 40 billion;
- M. whereas there continues to be a low level of military aid both in terms of quality and quantity and a delay of actual delivery of weapons and ammunitions to Ukraine after delivery decisions are taken; whereas many Member States are not meeting their pledges and some leading contributors even announced plans to significantly cut their contribution for military aid to Ukraine for 2025; whereas the EU has decided to use the windfall profits from frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia to support Ukraine, especially for additional military assistance; whereas no legal framework has been established for the effective capture and redistribution of capital gains from frozen Russian assets;
- N. whereas, in addition, Hungary is blocking both, the EUR 5 billion newly established Ukraine Assistance Fund within the European Peace Facility in March 2024 and the eighth tranche of EPF reimbursements for Member States that delivered military aid to Ukraine since more than 18 months;
- O. whereas since February 2022 the European Union has adopted 14 packages of European sanctions aimed at undermining Russia's ability to wage its illegal war of aggression;
- P. whereas EU Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels and uranium from Russia, contributing to the Russian economy and war chest; whereas sales of Russian fossil fuels to the EU since the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine exceeded EUR 200 billion, double the total funding provided to Ukraine in the same period; whereas the EU has granted an exemption for Russian crude oil imported through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic; whereas increased Russian gas imports by Azerbaijan are cause for concern about Azerbaijan as an alternative gas supplier to Russia as Baku, unable to meet the European demand, may relabel Russian gas as Azerbaijani for European consumption;
- 1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia's continued war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the involvement of Belarus in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of

Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land, nature and infrastructure;

2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, along with its full support Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN charter and the fundamental principles of international law reiterates its support to the EU's and its Member States' commitments to provide humanitarian assistance, military support, economic and financial aid as well as political support in every possible way until Ukraine's victory in order to ultimately stop Russia's war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people, re-establish full control within internationally recognised borders; stresses that the ultimate goal remains to achieve a just and lasting peace in Ukraine on its terms, ensuring the safety and dignity of its people within a peaceful and stable Europe;
3. Calls on the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war which must be based on full respect for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for the war crimes and the crime of aggression committed by Russia, and Russian reparations and other payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; calls for active EU engagement in implementing Ukraine's Peace Formula and creating the grounds for holding the second Peace Summit;
4. Calls on the Commission to swiftly propose long-term financial assistance for the reconstruction of Ukraine in collaboration with partner countries, in particular by ensuring swift implementation of and building on the Ukraine Facility, to ensure continued support at adequate levels and resources for reconstruction commensurate with our political support for a Ukraine;
5. Calls on all Member States to increase their funding for Ukraine and refrain from decreasing their contributions;; reiterates its firm conviction that Russia must provide financial compensation for the damage it has caused in Ukraine; welcomes the decision of the Council to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian state assets to the Ukraine Assistance Fund and the Ukraine Facility as well as the G7 decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian state assets; calls for quick progress in implementing the G7 decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian state assets, to ensure the timely disbursement of funds to Ukraine; calls for the EU to take the work forward, together with like-minded partners, by adapting sanctions legislation as necessary and by establishing a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian state-owned assets frozen by the EU;
6. Calls for a substantive increase of EU's humanitarian aid in order to ensure full support for Ukraine also in 2025; notes that the need for humanitarian support will likely continue for the years to come and stresses the need for the EU to be prepared to meet these needs with long-term planning and adequate funds; calls on neutral states to increase humanitarian aid to Ukraine;
7. Reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has the legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; recalls that the significant, though still

insufficient, military assistance provided by the EU, the US and like-minded partners is designed to allow Ukraine to effectively defend itself against an aggressor state and to re-establish full control over its entire internationally recognised territory;

8. Calls on Member States to immediately lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against legitimate military targets on Russian territory, which obstruct the ability of Ukraine to fully exercise its right to self-defence according to international public law and leave Ukraine exposed to attacks on its population and infrastructure;
9. Underlines that insufficient deliveries of ammunition and weapons and restrictions of their use risk offsetting efforts taken so far and deeply deplores the declining financial volume of bilateral military aid to Ukraine by Member States despite strong statements made at the beginning of this year; therefore, reiterates its calls on the Member States to fulfil their commitment of March 2023 to deliver one million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine, to accelerate weapons deliveries, in particular of modern air defence systems and other weapons and ammunition in response to clearly identified needs, including TAURUS missiles; calls for the swift implementation of the commitments made in Joint security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily with no less than 0,25 % of their GDP annually;
10. Underlines the need for enhanced air defence cooperation amongst Member States in thereby ensuring protection from threats that extend into EU and NATO airspace;
11. Calls on the European Commission to engage in strategic communication in the Member States to explain the importance of Ukraine's defence for Europe's broader stability and ensure that EU citizens are well informed about the significance of this assistance, both for Ukraine's sovereignty and for peace and security within the EU; welcomes and applauds the public effort and citizens' crowdfunding initiatives in some Member States ensuring a steady supply of weapons for Ukraine; further encourages similar initiatives across the EU to foster solidarity and public involvement in this critical cause;
12. Calls on the EU and its Member States to fulfil the commitments of the 2022 Versailles Declaration and to accelerate the full implementation of the Strategic Compass by enhancing European military cooperation at industrial and armed forces level, in order to make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider which is interoperable and complementary with NATO; stresses that concrete steps should be taken towards Ukraine's integration in EU defence and cybersecurity policies and programmes during the EU accession process; urges the EU institutions to accelerate the adoption of the European Defence Industry Strategy to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products, which would allow a timely provision of military support to Ukraine; calls on the Member States to honour their commitment to establish military production on Ukrainian territory; stresses the importance of cooperation with and integration in the long term of the Ukrainian defence industry into the EU's European defence technological base (EDTIB);
13. Commends the Ukraine Defence Contact Group for its vital role in coordinating international support and urges the EU Member States to increase their contributions to bolster Ukraine's defence capabilities;

14. Urges the Member States to actively pressure Hungary to end its blockade of the EPF, including the newly established Ukraine Assistance Fund;
15. Strongly condemns the use of sexual and gender-based violence as a weapon of war and stresses that this constitutes a war crime; calls on host and transit countries to guarantee access to sexual and reproductive health and rights services, particularly emergency contraception, post-exposure prophylaxis and abortion care, including for survivors of rape;
16. Reiterates its call on the EU to step up efforts to address the dire situation of those forcibly deported to Russia and children forcibly adopted in Russia, including by sanctioning persons directly responsible for and involved in the forced transfer and unjustified detention of Ukrainian children;
17. Urges Hungary to withdraw the decree cancelling state-funded shelter for refugees from western Ukraine and uphold its responsibilities under the EU Temporary Protection Directive;
18. Calls on the Council to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus, as well as non-EU countries and entities providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing its effectiveness and impact; condemns the recent transfer of ballistic missiles by Iran to Russia; urges EU Member States to further broaden and strengthen the sanctions regime against Iran and North Korea in light of these countries military support for Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and to add additional Chinese entities and individuals on the EU sanctions lists for their support of Russia's defence and security sector; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by EU-based companies, third parties and third states; calls the Council to design a new horizontal sanctions regime to counter this circumvention, which will require a more general and holistically applicable instrument to target circumvention in all regimes implemented by the EU;
19. Stresses that the impact of existing sanctions, as well as financial and military support to Ukraine will continue to be undermined as long as the EU allows the import of Russian fossil fuels; calls for a ban on importing Russian grain, potash and fertilisers as well as raw materials including aluminium, steel products, uranium, titanium, nickel, wood and wood products, gas and oil; calls on the EU and Member States to introduce a full ban on re-exported Russian refined oil products; furthermore calls on the implementation of "rules of origin" documentation that would ensure the true origin of oil products imported to the EU;
20. Calls on the G7 countries to more effectively enforce the price cap imposed on Russian sea-borne oil and to crack down on the loopholes used by Russia to repackage and sell its oil at market prices; calls on the EU and its Member States to exercise strict control over Russia's so-called shadow fleet, which, in addition to violating EU and G7 sanctions, poses an immense ecological threat to the ecosystem due to its technical deficiencies and frequent breakdowns;
21. Calls for a full Russian LNG embargo and sanctions against Gazprom and Russian oil companies; calls for the EU to impose requirements that Arc-7 ice-class vessels exporting

Russian LNG be included on OFAC and EU sanctions lists, denying them access to ports or Western maritime services; calls for the EU and its Member States to impose targeted sanctions on maritime vessels used by Russia for circumvention of sanctions on its oil and gas exports and servicing of its energy projects in the Arctic;

22. Calls for sanctions on Russia's nuclear sector and targeted sanctions against perpetrators of violations of nuclear safety and security at Zaporizhzhia NPP;
23. Condemns the increasing number of hybrid attacks carried out by Russia against the EU, its Member States and candidate countries, aimed at weakening European support for Ukraine through information manipulation, sabotages, covert destabilisation attempts, and corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States to work strategically and proactively to counter hybrid threats, to strengthen EU strategic communication and to prevent Russia's interference in political, electoral and other democratic processes in the EU and its neighbourhood;
24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Russian and the other governments concerned, and the United Nations.